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1 Introduction
Some philosophers believe that the passage of time is a real phenomenon. And
some of them find a reason to believe this when they attend to features of their
conscious experience. In fact this “argument from experience” is supposed to be
one of the main arguments for passage. What exactly does this argument look like?
Is it any good?
There are in fact many different arguments from experience. I am not sure
I understand them all. In this paper I want to talk about the three most interesting
arguments that I do understand.1 I am going to argue that all three of them fail.
∗Forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives.
1I will not say anything about A. N. Prior’s “Thank Goodness That’s Over”
argument (Prior 1959) because it is not an argument from experience (even though
it is often said to be). Here is Prior’s argument: I can be glad that my ordeal is over
without being glad that my ordeal is earlier than this thought or that my ordeal
is earlier than 12 noon. But the latter two propositions are the propositions that
some opponents of passage (the ones Prior knew) identified with the proposition
that my ordeal is over. Prior concluded that the object of my propositional attitude
is a proposition that only proponents of passage believe in.
Phenomenal experience does not play an important role in this argument. True,
there is some distinctive phenomenal “feel” that (sometimes? usually? always?)
occurs when I am glad about something. But what matters for Prior’s argument is
the propositional attitude component of gladness, not the phenomenological com-
ponent. The argument is about the objects of that propositional attitude. (Callender
(2008) mentions some other arguments advertised as connecting experience and
passage that, like Prior’s, do not in fact do so.)
1
2 The Passage Thesis
We should begin at the beginning: what are the theories of time under dispute here?
In one corner we have the B-theory. The B-theory says: there are times; the
times are structured by the relation x is r seconds earlier than y; this relation gives
time the same order and metric structure as the real numbers. And that is all.
In the other corner we have the moving spotlight theory. The moving spotlight
theory says that the B-theory leaves something out. In addition to the characteristics
the B-theory says time has, there is also this: exactly one time has the intrinsic
property presentness. (Maybe things located at that time and events that occur at
that time also have presentness.) Presentness is the “spotlight” that shines on just
one time. Moreover, which time has presentness changes. Some time has it, but
later times will have it, and earlier times have had it. The spotlight moves along
the series of times at a steady pace. It is this continual change in which time has
presentness that in the moving spotlight theory constitutes the passage of time, or
“objective becoming.” When B-theorists deny that the passage of time is a real
phenomenon they mean to deny that anything like this goes on; there is no such
property as presentness that is instantiated first by earlier and then by later times.
(There are, of course, other things “the passage of time” might mean and when
it has one of those other meanings a B-theorist might accept the sentence “The
passage of time is a real phenomenon.”)
There are four comments I should make about these theories.
First, I have just presented one version of the B-theory. There are other ver-
sions. Some versions disagree with my version about the structure of time. They
say that time has a metric structure but no intrinsic ordering. In those versions there
is no intrinsic difference between the future and the past directions in time. Other
versions of the B-theory say what my version says about the structure of time but
then say something different about which relation “gives” time that structure. (In
the version I presented a name for a unit of measurement (“second”) appears in the
predicate that expresses the relation that gives time its structure. Some might find
this objectionable.) Still other, more radical versions say that time has an order but
not a metric structure, or that time has a first, or a last, moment. And there are still
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other versions as well. The differences between these versions will not matter here.
Second, the moving spotlight theory is not the only theory that endorses pas-
sage. There are other “A-theories” of time, including presentism and the “growing
block” theory. I focus on the moving spotlight theory in this paper because I think
it is the best A-theory of time (though I will not defend this claim here). I am not
sure how good the arguments I will discuss would look (or even how they would
be formulated) if my target were instead, say, presentism. But for reasons of space
I cannot give a separate discussion of the argument from experience for each A-
theory.
Third, as I have formulated them the B-theory and the moving spotlight the-
ory are both versions of substantivalism: they say that there are such things as times.
Some philosophers reject this view. They say that while there are events and tem-
poral relations between events (they agree that World War II occurred after World
War I) there are no times at which those events are temporally located. This debate,
again, will not matter in what follows.
Fourth, my statement of the moving spotlight theory is likely to mislead if
it is not accompanied by some comments on the language in which the theory is
formulated. That language contains tense operators, including the operators “It will
be the case that...” and “It was the case that...” When the moving spotlight theorist
says “A time later than T will have presentness” he is abbreviating a sentence that
contains one of these operators — namely, “It will be the case that a time later
than T has presentness.” These tense operators are “primitive.” Truth-conditions
for sentences containing them cannot be given using quantification over times. So
the moving spotlight theorist says that the following is false:
(1) “It will be the case that T has presentness” is true at T* iff at a time later than
T*, T has presentness.
Why does the theory need primitive tense operators? Two connected reasons. First,
the moving spotlight theorist insists that “It will be the case that T has present-
ness” is true simpliciter. But (1) says that its truth is relativized to times. Second,
the truth-conditions in (1) treat presentness as a relation between times. But, the
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moving spotlight theorist says, it is not; it is an intrinsic property.2
3 The Argument from the Content of Experience
Some B-theorists have thought they could defuse all arguments from experience
without having to figure out just how those arguments work. They argue: supposing
that the moving spotlight theory is true, my experience would be just the same if
the B-theory were true, and vice versa. So experience cannot favor the moving
spotlight theory over the B-theory.3
This is a bad argument. Even if it is true that each of the theories is consistent
with my experience being as it is, it does not follow that the fact that my experience
is that way fails to favor one of the theories over the other. This is an instance of
a general epistemological truth: a body of evidence can support some hypothesis
without entailing that hypothesis. A body of evidence, for example, may be con-
sistent with each of two hypotheses but may be better explained by one hypothesis
than it is by the other. In that case the evidence favors the hypothesis that better
explains it. As we will see, some ways of putting together an argument from ex-
perience say that the moving spotlight theory better explains some feature of our
experience. Let us get on to what those arguments look like.
Here is a line of thought that leads to one of them. B-theorists admit that
2This is a compressed version of the argument that the moving spotlight theory
needs primitive tense operators. The argument may not be sound; there may be
versions of the moving spotlight theory that do without primitive tense operators.
But for the purposes of this paper we do not need to worry about whether this is
so. (See Zimmerman (2005) for a discussion of how best to formulate the moving
spotlight theory of time. Several different versions of the theory are described in
(Skow forthcoming).)
Moving spotlight theorists need not say that every tensed sentence abbreviates
a sentence containing primitive tense operators. They might sometimes mean by
tensed sentences just what B-theorists mean. So it might be that when a moving
spotlight theorist says “Greta won the race” what he says is true iff there is a time
T earlier than the time of utterance such that Greta wins the race at T.
3Price (1996, 14-15) gives this argument and Prosser (forthcoming-a) endorses
it. Maudlin (2007) denies the premise. But the argument is bad even if the premise
is granted.
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there seems to be an objective passage of time. They just say that this is an illusion.
Moving spotlight theorists, on the other hand, say that things are as they seem. Time
really does pass.
A moving spotlight theorist might stop here and argue: his theory is superior
because it is only in his theory that things are as they seem.4 But this is not a good
argument. A B-theorist might have an excellent story to tell about why things are
not as they seem. If he does then it should not count against his theory that it says
we are subject to an illusion.
So a better way to run the argument is to look at what each theory says about
why time seems to pass. The argument will be that the moving spotlight theory’s
explanation is better than the B-theorists’ explanations, and so (other things being
equal) we should believe the moving spotlight theory.
To understand this argument we must know what “time seems to pass” means
as it occurs in the argument. Now there are lots of things that “time seems to pass”
can mean. Here is one thing someone might say about it:
When I say that time seems to pass I have in mind the following kind
of thing. This weekend is my tenth college reunion. So I have been
thinking about my college years all day. I haven’t thought about that
stuff since the last reunion, five years ago. It all seems so much further
in the past now! That is the kind of thing I am talking about when I say
that time seems to pass.
This cannot explain what “time seems to pass” means in the argument I am dis-
cussing. That is because in the argument I am discussing the B-theorist follows up
his admission that time seems to pass with “but this is just an illusion.” But any
B-theorist who meant what the (fictional) speaker means by “time seems to pass”
would not say this. For (if the B-theory is true) there is nothing that the speaker
is wrong about. His college years seem farther in the past; and they are farther in
the past. The temporal distance between his act of thinking and the time he was in
college is greater.
4This seems to be the argument in (Hare 2010).
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So if there is an argument here for the moving spotlight theory then “time
seems to pass” as it occurs in the argument must mean something else. What else?
Comparing the moving spotlight theory and the B-theory to realism and elimina-
tivism about color suggests an interpretation.5 Realists and eliminativists about
color agree that ripe tomatoes seem red. This seeming is, of course, a “visual”
seeming: realists and eliminativists agree that ripe tomatoes look red. They agree
that ripe tomatoes are visually represented as red. Or, to say the same thing in a
more complicated way, they agree that the experience I have when I look at a red
tomato has the propositional content that the tomato is red.6 Realists about color go
on to say that ripe tomatoes are, in fact, red. They are as they look; our experience
represents them correctly. Eliminativists deny this. They say that while tomatoes
look red this is just an illusion.
One straightforward interpretation of “time seems to pass” is that it, like
“tomatoes look red,” is a claim about the content of some experience or experi-
ences. On this interpretation B-theorists and moving spotlight theorists agree that
the content of (some of) our experiences includes the proposition that there is objec-
tive becoming. Their disagreement is about whether the world is as our experience
represents it to be. What makes this interpretation plausible is that B-theorists like
to follow their concession that time seems to pass with “but this is just an illusion.”
An illusion is a kind of mis-representation. So if the passage of time is an illusion
there must be a (mis)representation around that represents its occurrence.
A more precise statement of the argument from the content of experience,
then, is this:7 experience favors the moving spotlight theory over the B-theory be-
5Several philosophers make this comparison; it goes back at least to (Grünbaum
1967).
6Some philosophers deny that “the tomato looks red to me,” “the tomato is visu-
ally represented as red to me,” and “I am having a visual experience with the content
that the tomato is red” are all equivalent. But — with one exception, which I will
come to shortly — there is no harm in this context in treating them as equivalent.
(See (Byrne 2009a) for discussion.)
7There is another argument that I might have called “the argument from the
content of experience.” That argument goes: the moving spotlight theory better ex-
plains why and how our experiences represent things as changing than the B-theory
does. (Among others, Le Poidevin (2007) and Dainton (2011) discuss something
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cause the moving spotlight theory has a better explanation of the fact that (some)
experiences have the content that time passes.8
To begin evaluating this argument let us look at the assumption it starts with:
the assumption that our experiences (some of them at least) have the content that
time passes. Now the objective passage of time consists in change in which time has
presentness.9 So if some of our experiences have the content that time passes, then
some of our experiences have the content that some time has, or some things that
exist in time have, presentness.10 And if some experience has the content that some-
thing has presentness, then, it seems safe to assume, some visual experience does.
So the assumption the argument starts with entails that some things are visually
represented as having presentness. Some things look like they have presentness.
Which things? Presumably all the things I see. This apple, that chair, the black-
board — each does not just look to have a certain shape and a certain color. Each
one also looks like it has presentness.
Is this true? I am not sure. It would help if I had some conception of what
something has to look like in order for it to look like it has presentness. A ripe
tomato and a firetruck look very different in many respects, but there is also a
like this argument.)
I will not say anything about this argument in the body of this paper. Here are
some brief comments on it. The argument might appeal to the idea, common among
A-theorists, that there is no “real change” in the B-theory (this idea goes back at
least to McTaggart (1908)). If this premise were true the argument might have
something going for it; but the premise is false (I have nothing to add to what other
B-theorists have said about why it is false). If the argument does not appeal to this
premise then I do not think the argument is even initially appealing.
8Remarks that suggest this argument may be found in many places. Some places
where it is relatively explicit are: (Smart 1980, 10), (Hestevold 1990, 541), (Taylor
1992, 81), (Smith 1994, 357), and (Paul 2010, 334-39). But there may be alternative
interpretations of each of these texts.
9According to the moving spotlight theory, at least. But that is the only theory
of passage I am considering in this paper.
10I write “has presentness” rather than “is present” to emphasize that the expe-
rience (allegedly) represents the intrinsic property that moving spotlight theorists
believe in and B-theorists do not. Later in the paper I will revert back to the more
natural “is present.”
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salient respect in which they look similar. And there is a respect in which both
look different from oranges and chocolate bars. It is (at least in part) by attending
to these similarities and differences that I get a grip on what something has to look
like in order for it to look red. But the analogous procedure for getting a grip on
what something has to look like in order for it to look like it has presentness does
not work. For either everything or nothing I see looks like it has presentness.11
I will have to press on without this kind of conceptual help. Now “the tomato
looks like it has presentness” strikes me as false. Actually, my response is much
stronger: it strikes me as crazy, as absurd. But I do not want to place much weight
on this judgment. For it may strike me as false only because I use the word “looks.”
Compare: does the tomato look like it exists? I find this question baffling. Never-
theless, I do think that my visual experience has the content that the tomato exists.
(Or at least I find this harder to deny.) Maybe, similarly, my visual experience rep-
resents that the tomato has presentness even though it sounds wrong to say that the
tomato looks like it has presentness.
So far I have reached no conclusion about whether things look like they have
presentness. Here is one argument someone might give in favor of this claim. We
agree that my visual experience represents that there is a tomato. But “is” here is the
present tense form of the verb “to be.” And representing that something is (present
tense) F is sufficient for representing that it has presentness.
I do not think that this is a very good argument in this context. A moving spot-
light theorist might accept this sufficient condition for representing that something
has presentness. But no B-theorist will. And what we want right now is a reason to
think that things are represented as present that even B-theorists can recognize.
This is as far as I have got in my thinking about the claim that everything I see
is visually represented as having presentness. I have not found a decisive reason to
accept this claim, but I also have not found a decisive reason to reject it. In order to
11I suppose someone could say that in normal conditions everything I see looks
like it has presentness, but there are very rare and very strange circumstances in
which I can see something that does not look like it has presentness. But I do not
know of anyone who has said this or said what those circumstances are, so this
possibility is no help in the present context.
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make some progress I am going to grant that it is true. The argument from content
is in trouble even if this claim is granted.
I should say one more thing about the status of this claim. I arrived at it from
the assumption that some experience represents that something has presentness.
But moving spotlight theorists do not need to agree that some visual experience has
this content. Of course, the moving spotlight theorist is hardly better off saying
that it is only auditory experiences that represent time passing. How odd it would
be to say that things sound like they have presentness but nothing looks like it has
presentness. But they could maintain that no experience that comes to us from the
five senses represents that something has presentness. Only experiences that come
from introspection have this content. So, the thought is, it does not look like time
passes, or sound like time passes. Apples do not look present and trains do not
sound present. Instead we have experiences as of the passage of time only when
we look “inward.” It is our own internal states, the states that are the objects of
introspection, that appear present. Some moving spotlight theorists might think
that this is a more plausible claim than the claim that things look present.
Introspection is a difficult topic. Some philosophers deny that we have a
quasi-perceptual faculty of introspection, an “inner eye” with which we may gaze
on our own internal states. (Byrne (forthcoming), building on some remarks by
Evans (1982, 226), defends this view.) If our inner states do not appear to us any
which way at all then they do not appear present and the move to introspection has
not helped. But suppose Byrne is wrong and we do have introspectable experiences.
Then I am also willing to grant for the sake of argument that when I introspect an
experience it is represented as present. However, in what follows I will stick to the
case of visual experience. I do not think anything turns on making this choice.
So let us assume that time does seem to pass. Which theory of time better
explains why this is so? It can look like the B-theory is at an initial disadvantage
here. The idea is that if time does pass then it is relatively easy to explain why it
seems to pass. The moving spotlight theorist just needs to say that this is an instance
of veridical perception. So, the thought goes, the moving spotlight theory already
has a relatively good explanation of the fact that time seems to pass. To defend
the B-theory B-theorists must produce a better explanation. And what they have to
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explain is why our experiences represent a property (or represent things having a
property) that nothing can have. And that has got to be relatively hard to do. What
will the B-theorist say is the cause of this illusion?
B-theorists have proposed explanations, some more detailed than others. (See,
for example, (Smart 1980), (Paul 2010), and (Prosser forthcoming-b).) But (con-
tinuing to grant that there is something to be explained here) I do not think we need
to know the details of the B-theorists’ explanations to know that the argument from
the content of experience is no good. That is because the moving spotlight theory’s
explanation, as it currently stands, is terrible.
Moving spotlight theorists want to explain why thinks look like they have pre-
sentness by appealing to the fact that those things in fact have presentness. So they
think that presentness is a visible property, a property we can veridically perceive
something to have by looking at it. They think that presentness is, in this respect,
like redness and squareness but unlike (say) electrical charge. Square things look
square in part because they are square, but nothing looks negatively charged.
For their explanation of the fact that time seems to pass to be any good mov-
ing spotlight theorists need to offer us some story explaining how (if their view is
correct) presentness manages to be visible rather than invisible. Otherwise their
explanation of the fact that time seems to pass has a big hole in the middle. But I
have never seen a moving spotlight theorist, or any A-theorist, tell such a story.
I have doubts about whether such a story can be told.12 My doubts emerges
from thinking about an argument for a different conclusion. D. H. Mellor argued
that “we do not observe the tense of events,” and some (including Hestevold (1990,
541)) have read Mellor’s argument as an argument that nothing looks present.13
The argument does not establish this conclusion; that is why I did not give it above.
But it leads us to where we now want to go. Here is the argument: I look through
a telescope and see a star. Unbeknownst to me the star is no more. It died in a
supernova years ago. But the star was so far away when it died that the light from
12Prosser (2007, 88) gives an argument for this claim that in some respects re-
sembles the one to follow. (See also (Prosser forthcoming-a).)
13Mellor’s argument is on page 26 of Real Time (1981). I have modified the
example in the argument.
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the supernova has not yet reached the earth. Later I go to the planetarium for a
lecture on that star. The planetarium is so good that when I look at the ceiling
things looks exactly as they did when I looked through the telescope. Hestevold
concludes: “since past events [or past things] appear through the telescope to an
observer in the same way that present events [or things] appear to the observer,”
nothing looks like it has presentness.
The problem with this argument is obvious: from the fact that the star and
the ceiling look the same it does not follow that neither looks present. Maybe they
both look present. It does not matter that the star is no longer around and does not
have presentness. If this is not obvious enough on its face consider the analogy with
redness. Suppose I turn my telescope onto another star, one that still exists. That
star looks red. In fact its color is indistinguishable from that of the tomato on my
desk.14 Unbeknownst to me the star is no longer red. Its color has changed as it has
aged. But the star is so far away that the light indicating its current color has not
yet reached the earth. It would be wrong to conclude: since non-red things appear
through the telescope to an observer in the same way as red things, nothing looks
red.
The second star looks red to me, even though it is not red, in part because
it was red when the light reaching me departed the star. The moving spotlight
theorist might say something similar about the first star: the first star looks like it
has presentness, even though it does not, in part because it had presentness when
the light reaching me departed the star.
But the analogy between redness and presentness here falls apart when you
think about it more. The picture in figure 1 captures what is going on when the star
looks red even though it no longer is. (In this and all other figures, the stick figure
depicts me.) The star is 500 light years away. Back in 1511 the star was red and red
light left the star. That light hits my eyes in 2011. The star looks red to me.
What picture captures what is going on when the star looks present even
though it no longer is? Maybe the picture in figure 2? In that picture the yellow
halo indicates which time (and which things) have presentness.
14I do not spend much time looking at the stars. Perhaps no star could look the
same in color as any tomato. If you think so then substitute a different example.
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Figure 1: The Brown Star Looks Red
1511
2011
Figure 2: The Star Looks Present?
1511
2011
This picture cannot be the right picture. For in it the light leaves the star in
1511, but the star does not have presentness. The story we are told, though, is that
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the star had presentness when the light left it.
We are running up against the feature of the moving spotlight theory that
makes the theory so hard to grasp. In that theory things and times have, or lack,
presentness simpliciter. They do not have, or lack, presentness at some times and
not at others. So while the light leaves the star in 1511, the star does not have
presentness in 1511. It also does not lack presentness in 1511. It lacks presentness
simpliciter.
Of course, the moving spotlight theorist will say, it was the case that the star
has presentness. But it is false that “it was the case that P” is true iff there is some
earlier time at which P.15 So the moving spotlight theorist may reply that we need
to consider the picture in figure 3 along with the picture in figure 2. In the picture
in figure 3 the star does have presentness. The picture in figure 2 depicts what is the
case; the picture in figure 3 depicts what was the case.
Figure 3: It was the case that...
1511
2011
15Instances of this schema are true for many sentences P; but not for all of them.
This will come up again below.
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But this only makes things worse. In one picture the star has presentness
and in the other it does not. But the exact state of the photons leaving the star
is the same in both pictures. Photons of the same frequencies depart in the same
directions. And the exact state of the photons arriving at my retina is the same in
both pictures. It is hard to see how presentness can be a visible property if this is
true.
Think about why redness is visible. Redness is a visible property because
things that have redness interact with light differently from things that lack it. (This
is not to say that no non-red thing ever looks red, just that this requires special
circumstances.) That kind of story about why presentness is visible has been ruled
out. We have just seen that having presentness makes no difference to the way
something interacts with light.
Of course, in my argument that presentness makes no difference I assumed
that when the spotlight moves from one time to another nothing else changes. Fig-
ures 2 and 3 differ only over the location of the halo. (More carefully, I have as-
sumed that if S is a sentence that does not contain “presentness” (or any other name
for or description of that property) and does not contain any primitive tense oper-
ators then “It was the case that S” is true iff S is true.) Might a moving spotlight
theorist abandon this assumption? He would have to say something like this: the
haloed photons differ in some physical way (maybe they have different frequencies)
from the unhaloed photons. It is false that the photons in 1511 are in the same phys-
ical state in both pictures. If the moving spotlight theorist says this then presentness
does seem to be making a difference to the light leaving objects that have it.
But it is hard to take this suggestion seriously. It seems flat-out inconsistent
with what we know about physics. In no physical theory that one might consult to
figure out how light leaves that star does presentness play a role in determining the
photons’ state.
So if presentness is visible it cannot be visible for the same kinds of reasons
that redness is visible.
This does not prove that presentness is not visible. For there may be other
ways a property can be visible. Suppose I have a twin brother. And suppose that
you do not know this and have never seen him. But you know me and see me all the
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time. One day my brother walks by your window and you see him for the first time.
You certainly believe that I am walking by. And your visual experience certainly
has the content that someone with qualitative features F is walking by (where F
are the qualitative features I have). But maybe more is true: maybe your extended
acquaintance with me also makes it the case that your visual experience has the
content that Skow is walking by. Perhaps the property of being Skow is represented
in your experience. If so then this property is visible even though my brother and I
reflect light in just the same ways.16
Maybe a story like this could be told about how presentness gets to be visible.
I do not know how it would go. I would certainly like to see it. But in the absence of
such a story the moving spotlight theorist does not have a better explanation for the
fact that time seems to pass than the B-theorist. The argument from content does
not succeed.
4 The Argument from the Phenomenal Character of Experience
I cheated a little bit when I reported Hestevold’s conclusion about the star. He did
not write “nothing looks like it has presentness.” What he actually wrote is “being
present is not a phenomenal property.” Now “phenomenal property” has several
uses in philosophy.17 I am not sure which way Hestevold is using it. It may be
that by “phenomenal property” he just means a property that may be represented
by experience. Then although he used different words his conclusion is the con-
clusion I reported: nothing looks present. But he might mean something else by
“phenomenal property.” That something else suggests a different argument from
experience.
Experiences do not just have representational content. They also have “phe-
nomenal character.” There is “something it is like” to have them. On one way of us-
ing “phenomenal property” talk about the phenomenal properties of an experience
is talk about that experience’s phenomenal character. When someone asks whether
presentness is a phenomenal property, then, he may be asking whether experiences
16Siegel (2011) thinks that visual experience can have contents like this.
17Byrne (2009b) explores the confusions around its use.
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that have presentness “feel” different from experiences that do not.
Is there an argument in favor of the moving spotlight theory lurking around
here? If there is it might go like this. The moving spotlight theorist starts by saying
that, in his view, experiences that have presentness do indeed feel different from ex-
periences that do not. He then says that this allows his theory to explain things that
the B-theory cannot explain, or cannot explain well. This explanatory advantage,
he continues, counts in favor of his theory. This, in outline, is the argument from
the phenomenal character of experience (for short: the argument from phenomenol-
ogy).
Like the argument from the content of experience, the argument from phe-
nomenology attempts to show that the moving spotlight theory is explanatorily su-
perior to the B-theory, and that for that reason we should believe it. The argument
from phenomenology might seem good even in light of what I have said about the
argument from content. Maybe the lesson of my discussion of the argument from
content is that when arguing in favor of passage the best way to interpret “It seems
like time passes” is not as a claim about the content of experience but instead as a
claim about its phenomenal character.
I want to make another comment about the relationship between the argu-
ment from content and the argument from phenomenology. Many philosophers
accept intentionalism: the thesis that the phenomenal character of an experience
is determined by, or at least supervenes on, its representational content. If inten-
tionalism is true then any moving spotlight theorist who says that experiences with
presentness have a distinctive phenomenal character must also say that they have
a distinctive representational content. Does this mean that if intentionalism is true
then the arguments from content and from phenomenology are the same argument?
Not necessarily. A moving spotlight theorist might say that although experi-
ences that have presentness differ in content from experiences that lack it, they do
not differ over whether they represent anything as having presentness. Their content
differs in some other way. (What other way? I have no idea. I am not suggesting
that this is a plausible claim.) A moving spotlight theorist who says this rejects a
premise of the argument from content. But he might still think that the argument
from phenomenology was good. So that argument would still deserve independent
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consideration.18
Let us take a closer look at the argument. I have only presented an outline
of the argument from phenomenology. I have not said what it is that the moving
spotlight theorist aims to explain. That is because I do not know any way of filling
in this detail that makes the argument plausible.
So what phenomenon is being explained? One candidate is: the fact that
my current experiences feel like this. Now this is not a particularly informative
characterization of the phenomenal character of my current experiences. But it will
do for now.
My current experiences occur on Tuesday. So my current experiences are my
Tuesday experiences. Those experiences have a certain phenomenal feel. The ques-
tion is: why do those experiences feel that way? The moving spotlight theorist says:
because they have presentness. The B-theorist will have some other explanation (it
will not matter what it looks like).
Now as I phrased the question it looks like the moving spotlight theorist aims
18Many B-theorists talk about the phenomenal character of experience when they
talk about the fact that time seems to pass. This suggests the argument from phe-
nomenology. Then in the next breath they say that although it seems like time passes
this is just an illusion. This suggests the argument from content. Maybe they talk
like this because they think the arguments are the same. Anyway, for this reason
it is hard to give examples of philosophers who definitely have the argument from
phenomenology rather than the argument from content in mind. One philosopher
who does at least sometimes seem to aim just at the argument from phenomenology
is Prosser in his paper “Could We Experience the Passage of Time?” He writes that
the objective passage of time is not “directly perceived through the outer senses in
the same way as colors.” That looks like a rejection of a premise in the argument
from content. Then he goes on to say that “time seeming to pass is a feature of
conscious experience with a distinctive phenomenology” (2007, 76-77). That looks
like an endorsement of the premise in the argument from phenomenology. (I think
that in the first part of this quotation Prosser means to make the stronger claim that
visual and auditory experience do not represent objective passage, not the weaker
claim that either they do not represent this or they do but what they represent is
false. I should say that this interpretation does not perfectly fit everything Prosser
says: some of the arguments in Prosser’s paper, like the one I referred to in footnote
12, are aimed at the argument from content.)
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to explain every aspect of the way my Tuesday experiences feel. But he need not
be that ambitious. It would do if he had a good explanation for just some aspect of
the way those experiences feel.
Okay, so, is the moving spotlight theory’s explanation a better explanation of
the feel of my Tuesday experiences? I am not going to answer this question directly.
Instead I am going to discuss a related question: is the moving spotlight theory’s
explanation any good? If it is not then we can safely assume it is not better than the
B-theorist’s.
If the moving spotlight theory’s explanation is to be any good then the moving
spotlight theorist has to say that experiences that lack presentness, but are otherwise
as similar as possible to my Tuesday experiences, have a different phenomenal char-
acter. Is that right? To answer it will help to reflect on an example. So suppose that
I spent today (Tuesday) in a red room (everything in it is red); and I did so on Mon-
day as well. On both days I have experiences as of red things, the same things on
both days. Only the Tuesday experiences have presentness,19 but the experiences
are otherwise the same. Then the moving spotlight theory says that things are as in
figure 4.
Do the Monday experiences feel different from the Tuesday experiences? I
do not think so. I think that the Monday experiences have the same phenomenal
character as the Tuesday experiences.
Suppose that I have a black-belt in autophenomenology. I can completely
and accurately describe the phenomenal character of my experiences. These de-
scriptions are so complete that no one description correctly describes experiences
that are phenomenally different. And my ability to appreciate the phenomenal char-
acter of my experiences is so good that I always produce an accurate description of
the phenomenal character of the experience I am describing. Now suppose that
on Monday I produce such a description, and I do so again on Tuesday. I write
these descriptions down on paper. I think it is obvious that the descriptions will be
word-for-word the same.
If I am right that the Monday and Tuesday experiences have the same phe-
19I am speaking loosely. Only the experiences during one instant on Tuesday
have presentness.
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Figure 4: The red rooms according to the moving spotlight theory
Tuesday
Monday
nomenal character then the fact that the Tuesday experiences have presentness can-
not explain why they feel like this. So the moving spotlight theory does not explain
why the Tuesday experiences have the phenomenal character they have.
I know how moving spotlight theorists will reply to all this. They will deny
that the Monday and Tuesday experiences have the same phenomenal character.
What it is like to have the Tuesday experiences differs from what it is like to have
the Monday experiences. To have a name for this difference let us say that on their
view only the Tuesday experiences feel “lustrous.” Moving spotlight theorists will
then say that the Tuesday experiences feel lustrous and the Monday experiences do
not because only the Tuesday experiences have presentness.20 And, the reply con-
cludes, B-theorists cannot explain why only the Tuesday experiences feel lustrous.
20By “E feels lustrous” some moving spotlight theorists might mean “E has some
phenomenal character.” These moving spotlight theorists think that if the B-theory
is true then no experience has any phenomenal character. (Maybe they should not
even be called “experiences.”) This is Peter Forrest’s view (Forrest 2004), except
that Forrest defends the growing block theory, not the moving spotlight theory.
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There is more to this reply. Why am I inclined to think that the Monday
and Tuesday experiences have the same phenomenal character? A moving spot-
light theorist might say that I confuse this false claim with a true one. That is the
claim that the phenomenal character the Tuesday experiences have is the same as
the phenomenal character the Monday experiences had. That is, only the Tuesday
experiences feel lustrous, but it was the case that only the Monday experiences feel
lustrous. The phenomenal character of my experiences has changed. (This is a kind
of change that only appears in the moving spotlight theory. For on the B-theory
it cannot happen that my Monday experiences have a certain feel at one time (on
Monday) and then a different feel at a later time (on Tuesday).)
What about the descriptions of the phenomenal character of my experiences
that I wrote down? Since I have a black-belt in autophenomenology I know all about
lustrousness. So I either wrote “lustrous” on both days or “lustrous” on neither day.
(“Lustrous” is not the complete description; but it is the only part we are interested
in now.) The moving spotlight theorist will probably say that I wrote “lustrous” on
both days, even though only the Tuesday experiences feel lustrous. What then about
the fact that I always produce accurate descriptions? He will say that understood
one way this claim cannot possibly be true. For since the phenomenal character
of a given experience changes, the accuracy of any description of it changes. No
description of the phenomenal character of that experience can always be accurate.
But there is another way to understand the claim so that it is true. Read it as the
claim that I always produce descriptions that are accurate “when I produce them.”
That is, the description I write on Tuesday is accurate and the description I write on
Monday was accurate. (But the description I write on Monday is inaccurate and the
description I write on Tuesday was inaccurate.) That is as reliable as I can be about
these things in the moving spotlight theory.
All I can say about this reply is that I continue to think that my Monday
and Tuesday experiences have the same phenomenal character. (I wish I had more
to say.) Nothing in the moving spotlight theorist’s reply persuades me that I am
confused when I think this. As a result, I do not think that there are any facts about
the phenomenal character of my experiences that the moving spotlight theory is
better placed to explain than the B-theorist.
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So I do not think that the argument from phenomenology is at all convinc-
ing. But I do think there is something interesting behind the argument. I just think
that the argument from phenomenology is the wrong way to articulate that some-
thing. I think that when moving spotlight theorists are tempted to say that present
experiences have a special feel it is because an entirely different argument from
experience is pulling on them. That argument is the final argument I will discuss.
5 The Argument from the Presented Experience, I
If the moving spotlight theorist admits that presentness makes no difference to how
things look, and makes no difference to how experiences feel, what possible con-
nection could there be between experience and passage? Without either of these
two claims, how is an argument from experience supposed to even get started?
Let’s go back to the beginning. Suppose (modifying my earlier example) that
yesterday (Monday) I meditated (with my eyes open) in my green room and that
today (Tuesday) I am meditating in my red room. The B-theory says that I see
green on Monday and I see red on Tuesday, and that is all (all that is relevant in this
context anyway). So the picture of reality that goes with the B-theory is the one in
figure 5.
The moving spotlight theory says that this picture is incomplete. For one
thing, it has left out which time has presentness. So the picture should look like the
picture in figure 6. Again, the yellow halo indicates which things have presentness.
(And again, the moving spotlight theory says that the picture is still incomplete. It
was the case that Monday has presentness, but this fact is not evident in the picture.
But that will not matter for now.)
Something about our experience is supposed to favor the second picture over
the first. What about our experience? And how does that feature of our experience
favor the second picture?
The third argument I want to discuss contains answers to these questions.21
The argument comes in two stages. Stage 1 of the argument aims to establish that
21As I said, I think that many arguments for the moving spotlight theory that
appeal to experience are attempts to articulate this argument. But the only explicit
presentation of something like this argument that I know of is in (Balashov 2005).
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Figure 5: My meditations according to the B-theory
Tuesday
Monday
Figure 6: My meditations according to the moving spotlight theory
Tuesday
Monday
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some time has presentness. The following speech is an attempt to articulate stage 1
(I present it in the first person):
Stage 1. The B-theory does not make very good sense of my experi-
ence. Yes, I see red on Tuesday and I see green on Monday. According
to the B-theory that is all. Nothing distinguishes the red experiences
from the green experiences (other than the colors they are experiences
of). This is hard to believe. Although I see green on Monday it is only
the red experiences (the experiences of red things) that are available to
me or presented to me. So the red experiences are distinguished. But
the fact that only the red experiences are presented to me is missing
from the B-theory.
The moving spotlight theory makes better sense of my experience.
It makes better sense of my experience for two connected reasons.
First, it does not say that nothing (other than color) distinguishes the
red from the green experiences. Instead, it says that the spotlight of
intrinsic privilege shines on the red experiences but not the green ones.
And second, the experiences that theory says are intrinsically privileged
are the only ones that are available to me or presented to me.
That is stage 1. Stage 2 aims to establish that which time has presentness changes.
An attempt to articulate stage 2 goes like this:
Stage 2. Which experiences are presented to me has been changing.
Not only are the red experiences available to me, but (as I remember)
the green experiences were available to me. Now suppose that stage
one of the argument has been successful. The experiences available to
me are the ones that have presentness. Then it follows that while Tues-
day and things that happen on Tuesday have presentness, Monday and
things that happened on Monday must have had presentness. But then
which time has presentness has changed. Time has passed. And this
change in which time has presentness cannot be understood to mean:
on Monday, Monday has presentness while on Tuesday, Tuesday has
presentness. For then the facts about presentness do not distinguish my
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Monday experiences from my Tuesday experiences. One day’s experi-
ences are distinguished only if one and only one time has presentness
simpliciter.
That is the argument from the presented experience. It is certainly an argument
from experience. And it is certainly distinct from the other two arguments I have
discussed. Nowhere does the argument say that things look present, or that the
passage of time is represented by some experience. And nowhere does the argument
say that presentness makes a difference to how experiences feel. It does not say
that experiences with presentness have some special phenomenal character. The
argument does have this much in common with the argument fron phenomenology:
it says that experiences with presentness are special. But instead of saying that they
feel different this argument says that experiences with presentness are the only ones
that are available to me.
It will help to have a more explicit statement of the premises of the argument.
I want to focus just on stage 1. The moving spotlight theorist and the B-theorist
agree that I have both green and red experiences (at different times). The moving
spotlight theorist insists
(P1) Only the red experiences are available to me.
But, the moving spotlight theorist says, according to the B-theory “nothing distin-
guishes the red experiences from the green experiences (other than the colors they
are experiences of).” This is meant to support
(P2) If the B-theory is true then either both the red and green experiences are
available to me, or neither the red nor the green experiences are available to
me.
From this it follows
(C) The B-theory is false.
The same kind of argument does not work against the moving spotlight theory be-
cause the analogue of (P2) is false in the moving spotlight theory. The moving spot-
light theory can say that all and only the experiences with presentness are available
to me. And only the red experiences have presentness.
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What is wrong with this argument? The argument makes use of a new and
unexplained notion: the notion of an experience being available to someone. One
reply to the argument focuses on this notion. What is it for an experience to be
available to someone? A natural answer is that at any time the experiences that
are available to someone at that time are the experiences he has at that time. This
answer makes availability a time-relative (and, of course, person-relative) notion.
How does the argument look if we read it as using this notion of availability? Since
(P1) is uttered on Tuesday, a reading on which it is true makes it equivalent to
(P1.1) Only the red experiences are available to me on Tuesday.
But then I reject the analogous reading of (P2):
(P2.1) If the B-theory is true then either both the red and green experiences are
available to me on Tuesday, or neither the red nor the green experiences are
available to me on Tuesday.
That’s not right. The green experiences certainly are not available to me on Tuesday.
The moving spotlight theorist supported (P2) by saying that there are no relevant
differences between the experiences. But he was looking in the wrong place. The
difference in availability is grounded in a difference in the relation each experience
bears to the temporal perspective from which I ask which experiences are available
to me.
Moving spotlight theorists will insist that this is not how they intended the
argument to be understood. The notion of availability the argument employs, they
will say, is one that is not time-relative.22 So the intended reading of (P1) is
(P1.2) Only the red experiences are available to me simpliciter.
(The “simpliciter” is meant to indicate a lack of time-relativity.) Similarly, the
intended reading of the second premise is
22Understood this way this argument for passage resembles Lewis’s argument
from temporary intrinsics for the doctrine of temporal parts (Lewis 1986, 202-04).
The resemblance will become closer in the next section.
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(P2.2) If the B-theory is true then either both the red and green experiences are
available to me simpliciter, or neither the red nor the green experiences are
available to me simpliciter.
In response to this I want to put my foot down and say that it makes no sense to
talk about which experiences are available to me simpliciter. The argument fails
because both premises (P1.2) and (P2.2) falsely presuppose that this does make
sense. If I am tempted to say that the red experiences are available to me simpliciter
it is only because the red experiences occur on Tuesday and it is on Tuesday that
I sit around contemplating which experiences are available to me. So they are the
ones that are available to me at the time I do the contemplating.
6 The Argument from the Presented Experience, II
Sometimes I think that this is a perfectly adequate response to the argument from
the presented experience. But at other times I think the response is weak. In this
section I want to present the reasons I have for thinking it is weak. Then I will
suggest a different response to the argument that is compatible with those thoughts.
When I think about the spatial analogue of this debate it is not so obvious
to me that the B-theorist is right. So what is the spatial analogue of the debate? I
have been talking about a story in which I see different colors on different days. I
see only red on Tuesday and only green on Monday. The spatially analogous story
is one in which I simultaneously see different colors in different places. So in the
story I will be simultaneously located in two different places.
Of course, I am already simultaneously located in two different places. I am
over here, where my left hand is, and I am also over there, where my right hand is.
But anyone who looked in either of the locations I just indicated would see only a
hand. In the scenario I have in mind something far more spectacular is going on. In
that scenario I am meditating in a red room in Massachusetts while simultaneously
meditating in a green room in Florida. Anyone who walked into the red room would
say he saw a whole person: head, torso, arms, legs, and so on. Anyone who walked
into the green room would say the same.
(Do I manage to be both in Massachusetts and in Florida by having one
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man-shaped part wholly in Massachusetts and another man-shaped part wholly in
Florida? Or do I have just one man-shaped part that is simultaneously wholly lo-
cated in Massachusetts and in Florida? These questions are analogues of questions
about how I persist over time: do I exist on Monday and on Tuesday by having a
temporal part that exists only during Monday and another that exists only during
Tuesday? Or am I wholly located during both days? The temporal versions of these
questions will be important soon. For now set them aside.)
The “spatial B-theory” says that I see red in Massachusetts and I see green in
Florida and that is all. The picture of reality that goes with this theory is the one in
figure 7.
Figure 7: My meditations according to the spatial B-theory
Massachusetts Florida
What picture goes with the “spatial moving spotlight theory”? That picture
is obtained from the picture in figure 7 by adding an special intrinsic property had
by only the things in Massachusetts (see figure 8). A yellow halo represents this
property.
The spatial moving spotlight theory does not just endorse the picture in figure
8. It also says that there is some spatial analogue of “primitive tense.” So the theory
also says something like this: although the spotlight shines on Massachusetts, to the
south it shines on Florida. This is a very mysterious statement. Fortunately, I think
we can set aside this part of the theory. Let us just focus on the part that says that
the spotlight shines on Massachusetts.
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Figure 8: My meditations according to the spatial moving spotlight theory
Massachusetts Florida
Now: which of the spatial pictures is better — the one in figure 7 or the
one in figure 8? It is hard to say, because both are ridiculous. Both say that I
am simultaneously in Massachusetts and in Florida. But I am not; I am only in
Massachusetts.
Still, suppose that I have become convinced that I am simultaneously in Mas-
sachusetts and in Florida. Perhaps the oracle of philosophy revealed it to me. And
suppose you have become convinced of something similar, and are contemplating
a similar pair of pictures depicting you. So we accept the common presupposition
of the spatial B-theory and the spatial moving spotlight theory. Now which theory
is better?
Again the debate will focus on a question about which experiences are avail-
able to me. The spatial moving spotlight theorist will say: you see red in Mas-
sachusetts and green in Florida. But there must be more to it than that. Surely
you think that it is only the red experiences that are available to you. The spatial
spotlight theory captures this fact and the spatial B-theory does not.
The response to this argument that parallels the one I described in the last
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section is: it makes no sense to talk about which experiences are available to you
simpliciter. The only intelligible notion of availability (that is relevant in this con-
text) is location-relative. The red experiences are available to you in Massachusetts
and the green ones are available to you in Florida. Insofar as you are tempted to
say that the red ones are available to you simpliciter, that is just because this entire
conversation is going on in Massachusetts.
Sometimes I just find this response difficult to believe. Maybe the following
is one way to bring out the difficulty. Try turning the argument around. Suppose that
the oracle, instead of telling you that you are in Massachusetts and in Florida, told
you instead (what you already believed) that the special intrinsic property that the
spatial moving spotlight theorist believes in does not exist. If someone less reliable
than the oracle then told you that you are in Florida as well as in Massachusetts, I
bet you would be tempted to reply with the following argument:
That is not true. I am seeing red. The guy in Florida is not seeing red.
By Leibniz’s Law, we are distinct.
Plenty of people, myself included, do want to give this argument. Plenty want
to give this argument even in a context in which the debate about the passage of
time has not been mentioned. For example, some versions of the many worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics say something like what the oracle said. They
say that each of us is simultaneously located in widely separated regions of space
(or in regions of space that are not even spatially connected to each other), having
quite different experiences in the different regions. When I have tried to explain
this theory to students many of them insistently object and give an argument like
the argument from Leibniz’s law.
But the argument from Leibniz’s Law is good only if there is an intelligible
notion of availability that is not location-relative. If there is no such notion then
the argument is unsound. (Exactly why it fails depends on how it is interpreted.
One of the premises is: “BAS is seeing red.” If this means “BAS is seeing red sim-
pliciter” (where here the “simpliciter” indicates an absence of location-relativity)
then it contains a nonsensical notion and so is not true. If it means “BAS is seeing
red in Massachusetts” then it is true. But then the argument is valid only if the
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next premise is interpreted to mean “The guy in Florida is not seeing red in Mas-
sachusetts.” And we have been given no reason to accept this premise. We only
know about what the guy in Florida is seeing in Florida.)
So I am sometimes tempted to think that there is an intelligible notion of
availability that applies to me and is not location-relative. Now this does not entail
that there is also an intelligible notion of availability that applies to me and is not
time-relative. But I think that time and space are similar enough that I would not
want to defend a view that accepted one kind of relativity and not the other. And
once I accept a time-independent notion of availability I cannot give the objection
to the argument from the presented experience that I described in the last section.
Fortunately there is another reply to that argument that is compatible with the
claim that there is a notion of availability that is not time-relative. In the rest of this
section I want to explain how that reply works.
Look back at figure 5. I said that it contains the picture of reality that goes
with the B-theory. But I presupposed some metaphysical claims in addition to the
B-theory when I drew that picture. In particular, I presupposed that I exist on both
Monday and Tuesday. This assumption certainly does not follow from the B-theory.
It is an independent assumption.
Of course, even though this assumption is independent of the B-theory it
looks like it is true in the scenario that figure 5 depicts. That scenario is one in
which today I am meditating in my red room and in which yesterday I meditated in
my green room. (Today is Tuesday, yesterday is Monday.) Certainly if I meditated
in my green room yesterday then I existed yesterday.
But wait: not every theory of persistence through time endorses this last
claim. The stage view, in particular, does not.23 The stage view says that “BAS
meditated in his green room on Monday” is true on Tuesday but denies that I exist
on Monday. The stage view is important because if I accept the stage view then I
can accept a notion of availability that is not time-relative but still reject one of the
moving spotlight theorist’s premises.
Before saying how that goes let me explain the stage view in more detail. The
23See (Sider 1996) for an explanation and defense of the stage view. The idea of
appealing to the stage theory to defend the B-theory comes from Balashov (2005).
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stage view says that I exist at only one time. Instead of identifying me with a four-
dimensional spacetime worm, it identifies me with just a single three-dimensional
“slice” of that worm. But the theory does not go on to say (for example) that “BAS
was a child” is false. (It had better not.) Why not? Well, that BAS was never a child
follows from the claim that BAS exists at only one time only if a certain analysis of
temporal predication is correct. That analysis is, roughly:
• “S was F” is true at t iff S exists at some time T earlier than t and at T S is F.
But the stage view rejects this analysis. It uses an alternative analysis: temporal
counterpart theory. That analysis of temporal predication says, roughly (here S is
an expression that refers to a person):
• “S was F” is true at t iff at a time earlier than t there is a person (who exists
for just an instant) who (i) is S’s temporal counterpart, and (ii) is F.
Who are my temporal counterparts? We do not need a definitive answer here. Dif-
ferent views about the “persistence conditions” for human persons correspond to
different candidate counterpart relations. One common theory says that my coun-
terparts are the people who are physically and psychologically continuous with me
in the right way. This package of views — the claim that no person exists at more
than one time and temporal counterpart theory — is the stage view.
To summarize, the stage view says this about me: there is no time at which
I am a child. But I was a child. That is because there is someone who is a child
and who exists at a time earlier than the current time and who is psychologically
continuous with me.
Now let us look at what the argument from the presented experience looks
like if I accept the stage view.
If I accept the stage view then I reject both the picture in figure 5 and the
picture in figure 6. Instead the pictures we need to focus on are the picture in figure
9 and the picture in figure 10. (In these pictures the stick figure drawn solid is me.
The one drawn dashed is someone else.)
The first is the picture the B-theorist draws and the second is the picture the
moving spotlight theorist draws. Importantly, the two episodes of seeing in figure 9
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Figure 9: My meditations according to the B-theory (on the stage view)
Tuesday
Monday
are not exactly the same except for the color seen. There is an extremely important
difference: in that picture I see red and someone else sees green.24
Once I accept the stage view I can say that it makes sense to ask which expe-
riences are available to me simpliciter. My answer is: all the experiences someone
(tenselessly) has are available to that person. So I say that (P1.2) makes sense and is
true. But the argument from the presented experience still fails, because now (P2.2)
is false.
7 The Argument from the Presented Experience, III
I have now presented two responses to the argument from the presented experience.
The second response sheds additional light on the first one. So I want to go back
and say a bit more about it.
24Of course, “I saw green on Monday” is true because that person sees green on
Monday. The stage view also says that while the guy who exists on Monday is (this
is the tenseless “is”) distinct from me, he was identical to me. Neither of these facts
is important right now though.
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Figure 10: My meditations according to the moving spotlight theory (on the stage
view)
Tuesday
Monday
The first response is available to a B-theorist who rejects the stage view. But
there are two alternatives to the stage view: endurantism, the thesis that a persisting
thing is wholly located at each time at which it exists; and perdurantism, the thesis
that a persisting thing has an instantaneous temporal part at each time at which it
exists. A B-theorist who accepts either of these theories should deny that it makes
sense to ask which experiences are available to me simpliciter.
But endurantism and perdurantism are not in exactly the same position with
respect to the argument. Perdurantism provides a kind of half-way house between
the two replies to the argument. Accepting it allows one to accept some of the
motivations behind the second reply without going so far as believing the stage
view.25 Let me explain.
A B-theorist who accepts perdurantism can accept that there are some things
25Ted Sider pressed me on this point. I owe a lot of what I say in this section to
correspondence with him.
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to which experiences are available simpliciter: instantaneous stages of persons.
All and only the experiences a stage ever has are available to it. But since the
theory identifies persons (like me) with four-dimensional spacetime worms rather
than stages, no experiences are available simpliciter to me, or to persons generally.
So a B-theorist who accepts perdurantism can still reject (P1.2) and (P2.2) of the
argument.
But he does not need to say that the ideas behind the second reply are com-
pletely off-track. He can say something like this:
The discussion of your meditations in Massachusetts and Florida def-
initely motivates the idea that there is a space- and time-independent
notion of availability. Since endurantism cannot recognize such a no-
tion endurantism is false. But the discussion does not go so far as to
motivate the idea that this notion applies to you. The claim that some
experience is available simpliciter to you is overreaching. Reflection
on your experience can only justify being confident that the red ex-
periences are available simpliciter to something. And perdurantism is
consistent with that: it says that the red experiences are available sim-
pliciter to your Massachusetts and your Tuesday stages (the stages that
are “doing the thinking” at the place, or time, at which you reflect in
the scenarios).26
Notice that the perdurantist can have only modest ambitions for the argument from
Leibniz’s Law. He cannot endorse it as formulated above. He cannot use it to refute
the claim that I have multiple spatial locations. Instead he can endorse a modified
version of the argument that refutes the claim that I am wholly located in more than
one location. But maybe that is a good thing; maybe it should not be so easy to
26This claim resembles something Lewis says about the problem of temporary
intrinsics. It seemed at first that Lewis’s complaint about endurantism was that
if endurantism is true then no tennis ball (for example) is round simpliciter. But
that is also false on perdurantism, his preferred theory. Lewis (1988) corrected
this impression: his complaint about endurantism is that if endurantism is true then
nothing is round simpliciter. It is enough if some things — stages of tennis balls —
are round simpliciter, even if no tennis ball is.
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refute the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
So what are the relative merits of the perdurantist and the stage-theoretic re-
sponses to the argument from the presented experience? How one answers this
question turns on how one thinks the motivation for accepting a time-independent
notion of availability works. The perdurantist (who is also a B-theorist) says: “I
am confident that the red experiences are available simpliciter to something, but I
am not so sure whether they are available simpliciter to me. Maybe they are just
available to a part of me — my current stage.” One might find this claim difficult
to believe. I myself am inclined to believe that I can only be confident that the red
experiences are available simpliciter to something by being confident that they are
available simplicter to me. A B-theorist who thinks this should prefer the stage
view to perdurantism.
8 Conclusion
“An excellent reason to believe in an objective passage of time is that our experi-
ence suggests that there is such a thing.” In this paper I have tried to figure out
what argument lies behind claims like this. I have discussed three arguments in
detail. The first argument starts from the claim that it is part of the content of our
experience that there is an objective passage of time. The second starts from the
claim that our experiences have some distinctive phenomenal character that is best
explained by the hypothesis that there is an objective passage of time. I do not think
these arguments are very good.
The third argument is better. It starts from the idea that not all of the expe-
riences I (tenselessly) have are on a par. Some of them are special. Some of them
are “presented to me” while the others are not. What’s more, which ones are pre-
sented keeps changing. The moving spotlight theorist says that his theory can make
better sense of this phenomenon. I suggested three responses a B-theorist can make
to this claim. He can reject talk of which experiences are presented to someone, or
available to someone, simpliciter. Or he can accept such talk, agree that some expe-
riences are available to him simpliciter, but deny that only some of his experiences
are available to him simpliciter. He can embrace the stage view and say instead that
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all his experiences are available to him simpliciter. Finally, he can accept talk of
time-independent availability but deny that some of his experiences are available to
him simpliciter. He can embrace perdurantism and say instead that the experiences
are available simpliciter only to his stages, not to him.27
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